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Fundamentalists toward democracy?  
Empirical analysis of fundamentalist attitudes and 
democratic attitudes in the Middle East 
Kazem Hajizadeh
Huntington asks an important question in The Third Wave: if traditional Islamic values and beliefs have 
significantly retarded democratic progress in the past, to what extent are they likely to continue to do so in 
the future? Unlike Huntington’s work, this paper is primarily a micro-level analysis. It seeks to show how 
Muslim people interpret and evaluate Islam and democracy. So we want to attach more data to Hunting-
ton’s theory and wish to demonstrate that non-democratic political space and authoritarian governments 
in Muslim countries can’t be explained by the features of Islam; there are considerable reasons and facts 
to convince scholars to look for other factors. The results illustrate nearly all Muslims tend to Islam and 
democracy at the same time. It seems Large populations of moderate fundamentalists in Muslim countries 
are appearing who struggle to actualize Islamic teachings in a democratic political model.
Outline of problem
Huntington’s The Third Wave makes a great contribution to macro-level poli-
tical sociology. It also includes many implications for scholars who are inte-
rested in contemporary religious movements. In chapter six, he argues that 
there are some cultural obstacles to Democratization as well as economic and 
political ones.
A less restrictive version of the cultural obstacle argument is not that only 
one culture is peculiarly to democracy but that one or more cultures are pe-
culiarly hostile to it. The two cultures most often cited are Confucianism and 
Islam. In this regard, Huntington asks three questions:
1) To what extent are traditional Confucian and Islamic values and beliefs 
hostile to democracy?  
2) If they are, to what extent have these cultures in fact hampered progress 
toward democracy?   
3) If they have significantly retarded democratic progress in the past, to 
what extent are they likely to continue to do so in the future? (Huntington 
1991a: 300).
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In one hand, Huntington argues – based on Ernest Gellner’s work – that 
the high culture form of Islam is endowed with a number of features – unita-
rianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian 
aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic – that are 
congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernization. 
They are also generally congruent with the requirements of democracy. On 
the other hand, he believes that fundamentalist Muslims demand a country’s 
sovereignty be in the hands of pious Muslims; that Shari’a be the law; and 
clergy have a decisive vote in policy-making. Finally, He points to two main 
solutions to cultural obstacle:
1) Great cultural traditions like Islam and Confucianism are highly com-
plex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavior patterns. 
Any major culture, including Confucianism, has some elements that are com-
patible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have ele-
ments that are clearly undemocratic. 
2) Cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant. The dominant beliefs 
and attitudes in a society change. While maintaining elements of continuity, 
the prevailing culture of a society in one generation may differ significantly 
from what it was one or two generations earlier. (Huntington 1991b: 28, 30).
This paper is focused on the second and the third questions. Unlike Hun-
tington’s work, it is primarily a micro-level analysis. It seeks to show how 
Muslim people interpret and evaluate Islam and democracy. So we want to 
attach more data to Huntington’s theory and wish to take a step further.
What is fundamentalism? Who are fundamentalists? Historically, Ahmad 
ibn Hanbal (780-855) and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) were the first funda-
mentalists and today Sunni Muslims consider them as the two prime fun-
damentalists. Ibn Hanbal, though a renowned scholar and theologian, was 
mostly famous for his collections of the Traditions and his emphasis upon the 
Qur’an and the hadith as the primary sources of legal knowledge. Consequen-
tly, Hanbali juristic doctrine has a strong traditionalist and conservative cha-
racter. Inevitably, he was compelled to defend himself against the teachings 
of the Mu’tazilites during the mihna and he adopted what one would expect 
on such issues: a Traditionist approach which states that one should look to 
the primary sources of the Qu’ran and the hadith and accept what is written 
without interpretation or further discussion. The Hanbali law school curren-
tly dominates Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and has a limited following 
in Syria and Iraq. Among the most prominent adherents of Hanbali doctrine 
were Ibn Taymiyya and, more recently, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 
1792) whose alliance with Ibn Saud, ancestor of the founders of Saudi Arabia, 
resulted in the Hanbali school becoming the official doctrine in that country 
( Jackson 2006: 45-47).
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There is also Shi’i fundamentalism. Imam Khomeini (1902-1989) and 
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr (1935-1980) are the contemporary figures 
who led Iranians and Iraqis toward Islamic revival. 
Shi’i fundamentalism can be distinguished by following characteristics:
- Believing in Islam as a total way of  life even during the Occultation of  the Imam. 
- Paying great attention to Islamic social and political philosophy and jurispru-
dence. 
- Insisting on the necessity of  establishing a religious government in the absen-
ce of  the Imam.
- Believing in the unity of  state and religion during the Occultation period. 
- Emphasizing on the responsibility of  Muslims to take preliminary steps to-
ward the promised global just government of  Imam Mahdi (Hashemi-Najafa-
badi 2010: 193-194).
Savage thinks that 
there is an armored structure to fundamentalisms: they are hierarchical – in 
regard to gender and religious leaders –, centrally organized – around an au-
thority belief  –, clearly demarcated against outsiders, and goal-driven towards 
a sacred past or future. What can be said of  these varied fundamentalisms is 
that fundamentalism is not one “thing”, but rather it is the shape that religion 
takes when it is under threat (Savage, 2011: 133). 
Most of Muslim countries were once the colonies of Western countries. 
Algeria became independent from France in 1962; Djibouti from France in 
1977, Gambia from UK in 1965, Mali from France in 1960, Niger from Fran-
ce in 1960, Senegal from France in 1960, Sierra Leone from UK in 1961, 
Sudan from Egypt and UK in 1956, and so on. Colonialism threatened both 
economic and cultural assets. Religion “has been an important source of iden-
tity, which has been especially important in the context of the struggle against 
colonialism” (Fox 2008: 30).
Fundamentalism is rising as an antithesis of globalizing modernity and 
secularity (Ercins 2009; Vorster 2007). It’s growing especially in Muslim 
countries. 88 percent of people in Saudi Arabia and 71 percent of Al-
gerians agree that only the laws of the Shari’a should be implemented. 
In Turkey 68 percent believe that religious leaders should inf luence the 
government. 95 percent of Pakistanians and 75 percent of Iranians belie-
ve that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public off ice. 
In Iraq 78 percent and in Egypt 60 percent believe that churches give 
answers to social problems.
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In recent decades fundamentalists have been acquiring power in Muslim 
countries and religious state is the first goal of Islamic fundamentalism 
(Abukhalil 1997; Esposito 1998).   
It is fair to say that Muslims generally believe in the holistic nature of 
Islam. As an instrument for understanding life, Islam is often considered to be 
something more than a mere religion. In particular, Islam does not recognize 
the separation between the spiritual and the temporal – although the two do-
mains can be distinguished –. On the contrary, Islam offers an ethical guide 
for all aspects of life.
Some view Islamic fundamentalism as a school essentially associated with 
Radicalism and violence. From a particular approach, every religion relies 
on some major fundaments which vitalize them through the human history. 
Consequently, if a certain religion was in a dangerous situation and felt in-
vading external entities, it would defend itself- perhaps in a violent manner 
– and purify itself – perhaps in an isolation form. Islamic fundamentalists 
utilizing violence are a small population compared to the large population of 
Muslim people – not affiliated to radical groups – who have moderate attitude 
to fundamentalism.
Moghaddam, drawing broadly from a variety of psychological constructs, 
developed the “staircase to Terrorism” as a metaphor for the process of violent 
radicalization. The “staircase” narrows as it ascends from the ground floor 
and through five successive levels. There are six floors: 
According to figure 1, people begin with a desire to alleviate adversity and 
improve their situation. After Unsuccessful attempts and climbing the floors, 
some of those sympathizers eventually join an extremist group, organization, 
or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence. At 
the top or final level among those who have joined are those who overcome 
any barriers to action and actually commit a terrorist act. Violent radicali-
zation and engagement in terrorism is best viewed as a unique and dynamic 
psychosocial process in which only a small number of individuals with a spe-
cial social space would engage (Borum 2011).
Consequently, we study all Muslim people and concentrate on those who 
are more fundamentalist. From our viewpoint, two major components con-
stitute Islamic fundamentalism: Islamic social system in which Islamic law 
– based on Quran and Sunnah – is implemented; and Islamic government 
which is responsible for providing appropriate conditions. Other fundamen-
talist characteristics – such as different roles of men and women – can be 
derived from these two elements.
Fundamentalism grew fast at the end of the twentieth century as a respon-
se to the crises emerging in Muslim countries. A huge population of Muslims 
joint Islamic movements. They believed that the solution to our political pro-
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blems today was the return to the social and political values indicated in Islam 
(Dekmejian, 1985).  
Method
The Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset (1988-2010) inclu-
des both individual-level and country-level variables. Data on individual-level 
variables are drawn from 34 surveys carried out in 12 Arab countries, Turkey, 
and Iran. Taken together, a total of 54,894 men and women were surveyed. 
Almost all of the surveys involved face-to-face interviews. Most of the surveys 
were carried out either as the first wave of the Arab Barometer, the third, 
fourth, and fifth waves of the World Values Survey, or a project on attitudes 
related to governance carried out by Mark Tessler with funding from the Na-
tional Science Foundation. Table 1 shows the details of all surveys.
All of the surveys contain a large number of relevant questions, and the 
Carnegie Data Set thus includes almost 200 individual level variables per-
taining to politically relevant attitudes, values and behavior. There are also 
many individual-level variables pertaining to the personal attributes of re-
spondents, such as age, sex and educational level.
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The inclusion in the Carnegie Data Set of time-specific country-level varia-
bles is designed to permit and encourage two-level analyses that investigate re-
lationships between the orientations of ordinary citizens and the characteristics 
of the countries and time periods in which these men and women are located.
This article analyses three categories: the items which indicate funda-
mentalism; the items which indicate democratic attitudes; and the indica-
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Source: The Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset (1988-2010), 
ICPSR 32302.
297FUNDAMENTALISTS TOWARD DEMOCRACY?
tors which include both fundamentalism and democracy. The indicators are 
as below:
Fundamentalism
• Government should implement only the laws of the Shari‘a.
• Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-
political life.
• It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs 
held public office.
Democracy
• In a democracy, the economy runs badly.
• Democracies are not good at maintaining order.
• Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of 
government.
Fundamentalism and Democracy
• Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam.
• Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of 
the people in some areas and implement Shari‘a in others.
In the next part, first, all of eight indicators are statistically described; and 
second, six items constituting two indices – F Index and D Index1 – make a 
crosstab which offers an abstract picture. It helps us to sum up all the infor-
mation; go from specific details to general beings and becomings and make 
a conclusion. 
Results
Table 2 points to the importance of making laws exactly based on the Shari’a 
from Muslims’ view. People of Palestine have been located between “impor-
tant” and “somewhat important” on the scale with a brief change since 1999. 
Jordan and Algeria revolve “important” in a slightly wavy manner. Morocco 
moves from “somewhat important” to “important”. Kuwait and Iraq take the 
inverse direction. Yemen and Egypt move toward “very important”. Saudi 
Arabia is the only one getting “very important” and Lebanon is the only one 
standing on “not important”. Bahrain in 2009 is very similar to Kuwait in 
1988 and Jordan in 2003.  
Mean of this indicator in the period (1988-2009) is 2.32. Overall, Muslims 
evaluate this item as “important”.   
1  F Index (FI) and D Index (DI) represent Fundamentalist attitudes and Democratic attitudes 
respectively. 
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Table 2: Government should implement only the laws of the Shari‘a (1= very important, 2= 
important, 3= somewhat important, 4= not important, 5= not important at all)
Country Means on timeline
Palestine 1999 (2.52) 2003 (2.45) 2006 (2.71) 2008 (2.98)
Jordan 2001 (1.73) 2003 (2.28) 2006 (1.92)
Algeria 2002 (2.10) 2004 (2.38) 2006 (1.78)
Morocco 2005 (2.69) 2006 (1.70)
Kuwait 1988 (2.28) 2005 (3.09)
Yemen 2006 (2.36) 2007 (1.60)
Iraq 2004 (2.42) 2006 (2.68)
Egypt 1988 (2.32) 2000 (1.80)
Saudi Arabia 2003 (1.49)
Bahrain 2009 (2.29)
Lebanon 2007 (3.84)
Fundamentalists believe that Islam and socio-political life are interlocked 
and Muslims should actualize Islamic teachings in their society. This item shows 
a polarized situation in Palestine, Jordan, Algeria (2004), Morocco (2006), Ku-
wait (2005), Yemen and Bahrain. This situation changes in favor of fundamen-
talism in Palestine, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco. In Palestine (1995), Morocco 
(2005) and Lebanon, fundamentalists are absolutely minor leagues.
Egyptians nearly strongly agree with this item. Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Lebanon stand on “disagree”. Yemen moves toward disagree but there is a 
0.75 distance yet. Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine change in favor of 
fundamentalist attitudes. Iraq takes the way to “neither agree nor disagree”. 
Turkey is located between 2 and 3 with no variation. Overall, 26 percent of 
Muslims strongly agree and 33 percent agree with the item; Thus, 59 percent 
think that people with strong religious beliefs should hold public office.
People of Jordan in 2001, 2003 and 2006 disagree and in 2007 strongly 
disagree with the statement. Morocco goes beyond “disagree” in 2006 and 
continues in the same way. Algeria is almost constant. Yemen and Palestine 
change against democracy. On the contrary, Iran, Turkey2 and Egypt mo-
2  Yavuz argues that In Turkey, Islamic bourgeois grew fast as a result of  evolving public space 
and making democratic policies in the market in 1980s (Yavuz 2009).    
299FUNDAMENTALISTS TOWARD DEMOCRACY?
ves toward “strongly disagree” quickly. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon 
and Bahrain score 3 without exception. Positive attitude to democracy is cle-
ar. 43 percent of all Muslims disagree and 32 percent strongly disagree with 
this item. There is a minority having a negative image of democracy.  
Rounded figures point to 3; in other words all Muslims disagree with the 
item. Morocco (2006), Egypt and Kuwait are the top three. The result is won-
derful. In 2000s, Muslims, without exception, believe that democracy as a 
form of political system manages to maintain social order.
Table 3: Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life 
(1= Agree, 2= Neither agree nor disagree, 3= Disagree)






























































Table 4: It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public offi-
ce (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree)
Country Means on timeline
Jordan 2001 (2.28) 2003 (2.88) 2006 (2.93) 2007 (2.24)
Algeria 2002 (2.80) 2004 (2.31) 2006 (2.78)
Morocco 2001 (2.49) 2006 (2.41) 2007 (2.24)
Palestine 2003 (2.87) 2006 (2.65)
Yemen 2006 (3.09) 2007 (3.25)
Iraq 2004 (2.52) 2006 (2.90)






Table 5: In a democracy, the economy runs badly (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disagree, 4= 
strongly disagree)
Country Means on timeline
Jordan 2001 (2.88) 2003 (2.85) 2006 (2.65) 2007 (3.66)
Morocco 2001 (2.71) 2005 (2.74) 2006 (3.29) 2007 (3.35)
Algeria 2002 (2.74) 2004 (2.75) 2006 (2.66)
Yemen 2006 (2.71) 2007 (2.57)
Iran 2000 (2.85) 2005 (3.34)
Turkey 2001 (2.77) 2007 (3.48)
Egypt 2000 (3.03) 2006 (3.63)
Palestine 2003 (2.87) 2006 (2.63)
Iraq 2004 (2.88)





This item best represents democratic attitudes. Similarly, rounded figures 
point to 1 or 2. People of Morocco (2001) and Egypt strongly agree and others 
agree with the statement. Tables 5, 6 and 7 confirm one another. They carry a 
clear message: Muslims tend to democracy as a form of government and there 
is a consensus among them.   
Table 8 and 9 are different from the previous ones. In table 8, there is an 
item defining democracy as a system opposing Islam. On the contrary, the 
next item brings Islam and democracy together.
Jordan, Palestine, Algeria and Morocco move toward “disagree”. People 
of Kuwait, Lebanon and Bahrain disagree with the item. Yemen is located 
near 3 on the scale. Lebanon, Morocco (2006) and Bahrain express the most 
disagreement. More than 65 percent of all Muslims strongly agree or agree 
with the statement. There is also 7 percent whose opinion is neutral. The 
“clash” thesis claims that there are sharp cultural differences between the 
core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian herita-
ge – particularly those concerning representative democracy – and the beliefs 
common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies. Huntington be-
lieves that the main elements of Western civilization include the separation 
Table 6: Democracies are not good at maintaining order (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disa-
gree, 4= strongly disagree)
Country Means on timeline
Jordan 2001 (2.89) 2003 (2.77) 2006 (2.68)
Algeria 2002 (2.74) 2004 (2.70) 2006 (2.59)
Morocco 2001 (2.60) 2005 (2.71) 2006 (3.27)
Yemen 2006 (2.86) 2007 (2.72)
Palestine 2003 (2.78) 2006 (2.58)
Iraq 2004 (2.72)
Egypt 2000 (3.01)







of sacred and secular authority, the rule of law and pluralism, the democra-
tic structures of representative government and the protection of individual 
rights and liberties as the buffer between people and the state (Norris and In-
glehart 2011: 135). It seems Muslims can get along with democracy just to the 
extent where sacred authority still remains. If democracy can survive without 
secularization, it will become Muslims’ favorite political form.   
Palestine and Yemen moves from “important” to “somewhat important”. 
Algeria, Morocco and Jordan revolve 2. Kuwait and Bahrain are the same; 
both of them evaluate the item as “important”. Lebanon score 3; it is so-
mewhat important to make laws according to the wishes of the people in some 
areas and based on Shari’a in others. Total mean of this indicator is 2.22; in 
other words, Muslims tend to such a political combination.
In Diagram 1, proportional frequency of each cell is presented. More than 
30% of all Muslims have moderately fundamentalist and democratic attitu-
des. There is 17% whose FI and DI are 2 and 1 respectively and there is 14% 
whose FI and DI are 1 and 2 respectively. Only 3% are pure fundamenta-
Table 7: Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government (1= 
strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disagree, 4= strongly disagree)
Country Means on timeline
Jordan 2001 (1.72) 2003 (1.82) 2006 (1.87)
Palestine 2003 (1.94) 2006 (1.97) 2008 (1.99)
Algeria 2002 (1.67) 2004 (1.93) 2006 (1.91)
Morocco 2001 (1.29) 2005 (1.74) 2006 (1.55)
Yemen 2006 (1.77) 2007 (1.94)
Iraq 2004 (1.69) 2006 (1.67)
Egypt 2000 (1.39)







lists and only 8% represent purely democratic attitudes. Pure fundamenta-
lists and democrats are shifting to the central cell. Radical fundamentalist 
movements do not represent the majority of Muslims or Islamic movements; 
they include a few small groups. Unlike radical fundamentalists who reject 
dialogue, conciliation and cooperation, moderate fundamentalists participate 
in legal political processes and protect tolerance, freedom, civil society and 
democratic values (Moussalli, 1995). Ahmad Moussali redefines the bases 
and scope of modern Islamic thought, suggesting that Islamic fundamenta-
Table 8: Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam (1= 
strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree)
Country Means on timeline
Jordan 2003 (3.23) 2006 (3.52) 2008 (3.48)
Palestine 2003 (3.11) 2006 (3.42) 2008 (3.58)
Algeria 2002 (3.22) 2004 (3.14) 2006 (3.49)





Table 9: Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people in 
some areas and implement shari‘a in others (1= very important, 2= important, 3= somewhat 
important, 4= not important, 5= not important at all)
Country Means on timeline
Palestine 2003 (1.97) 2006 (2.54) 2008 (2.52)
Algeria 2004 (1.93) 2006 (2.28)
Morocco 2005 (2.08) 2006 (1.75)
Yemen 2006 (2.10) 2007 (2.63)





lism might prove to be a liberating theology for the modern Islamic world. 
Basing his argument largely on Arabic documents, he analyzes the basic con-
cerns of fundamentalism. He examines the ideas of major Muslim thinkers 
who have affected the contemporary Islamic revival – especially Hasan al-
Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Hasan al-Turabi – showing the range of Islamic 
fundamentalist views from liberal democracy to authoritarianism. He then 
discusses how their thinking could affect an Islamic state, from political re-
pression at one extreme to political representation at the other. Going to the 
core of issues raised by fundamentalists, he maintains that Islamic fundamen-
talism is a modern development that will have a lasting impact on the history 
of Islam – one comparable to the impact of Protestantism on the history of 
Christianity (Moussalli 1999) –. Thus, fundamentalism should be viewed as 
a dynamic doctrine which is engaged in political debates. It is performing the 
role of providing an ideology explaining political and social reality to indivi-
dual Muslims.   
Conclusion
More than a year after 2010, there continues to be a strong desire for demo-
cracy in Arab and other predominantly Muslim nations. Indeed, these publics 
do not just support the general notion of democracy – they also embrace spe-
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cific features of a democratic system, such as competitive elections and free 
speech –. On the other hand, a substantial number in key Muslim countries 
want a large role for Islam in political life; however, there are significant dif-
ferences over the degree to which the legal system should be based on Islam. 
In presentations of democracy within a broad conceptual framework, much 
attention is given to some specific aspects of social and political operation. In 
particular, Islamic democracy is seen as affirming longstanding Islamic con-
cepts of consultation (shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive 
judgement (ijtihad). Like many concepts in western political tradition, these 
terms have not always been identified with democratic institutions and have 
a variety of usages in contemporary Muslim discourse. However, regardless 
of other contexts and usages, these terms are central to the debates and di-
scussions regarding democratizations in Muslim societies (Esposito 1996: 
27). Large populations of moderate fundamentalists in Muslim countries are 
emerging who seek to actualize Islamic teachings in a modern form which 
adopts and raises some of the western concepts such as democracy. It seems 
Muslims will create a new religious political system absorbing some democra-
tic values and norms.     
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